Legal Frontiers of Death and Dying, NORMAN L. CANTOR, Indiana
University Press, Bloomington, Indiana 1987, pp. 182.
In the short story "The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar,' '
Edgar Allan Poe captured the horror of a person suspended indefinitely between life and death. Medical technology is now
analogous to the function that hypnosis served in Poe's story:
maintaining in someone the appearance of life even after the
body and the mind have ceased functioning. Technology has
created the strange situation in which medicine can keep patients
alive-in some sense of that term-longer than they themselves
would have wanted to be kept alive, and perhaps longer than
would be "humane." '2 It is estimated that at least 10,000 Americans are in irreversible comas. Advances in technology, in turn,
have spawned a series of difficult legal problems, given the general name "the right to die." Legal recognition of a patient's
right to refuse or to discontinue life-preserving medical treatment is quite recent. The modern development of the doctrine
began with the case of Karen Ann Quinlan.4 A mere dozen years
1 GREAT SHORT WORKS OF EDGAR ALLAN POE 479 (G.R. Thompson ed. 1970).

In "Valdemar" the narrator hypnotized a patient at the moment of death to determine "to what extent, or for how long a period, the encroachments of Death might
be arrested by the process." Id. at 480. The narrator "succeeds" in arresting the
moment of death for seven months and even gets the patient to "speak"; however,
events do not unfold quite as the narrator had expected. Id. at 485-89.
2 In re Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 340 (Minn. 1984) ("The
ultimate horror [is not] death but the possibility of being maintained in limbo, in a
sterile room, by machines controlled by stranger.") (citation omitted). See also
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 437, 497 N.E.2d 626, 637
(1986) (referring to patient maintained in a chronic vegetative state for 37 years).
It may be short-sighted to attribute this problem primarily to advances in technology. A discussion of the long-term causes of this problem should also include
the growing likelihood that in our society an elderly person will have to face death
alone in a hospital or nursing home, rather than at home surrounded by family.
3 N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1987, at 22, col. 5 (nat'l ed.).
4 Ms. Quinlan was in an irreversible coma. Her father, as guardian, requested
judicial authorization to remove her respirator, an act that medical experts had predicted would result in death shortly thereafter. The Supreme Court of New Jersey
granted the request. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied 429
U.S. 922 (1976).
The significance of the court's decision can be seen when the decision is considered in its legal context. The New Jersey Supreme Court was acting contrary to
its own precedent. Furthermore, the court acted without legislative support, and
without any guiding precedent from other courts. See John F. Kennedy Memorial
Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
In retrospect, the Quinlan opinion often seems awkward or unsophisticated.
The court instructed the guardian and family of Ms. Quinlan "to render their best
judgment" as to whether she would choose to discontinue treatment. Quinlan, 70
N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. Yet the court was unwilling to consider Ms. Quinlan's
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later, there are approximately 100 major state court opinions
(and a handful of federal district court opinions) concerning the
refusal or discontinuation of life-sustaining medical treatment.5
A growing majority of courts has recognized broad patients'
6
rights in this area.

The right to die cases have captured extensive media attention. The emotional power of these cases may come from our
ability to identify in turn with the patient--either as the person
who wanted the suffering to end or as the isolated person, vulnerable to an uncaring institution; with the patient's family-who
own past comments as evidence of what choice she would have made. Id. At the
same time, the court was sure what her answer would have been: "We have no
doubt, in these unhappy circumstances, that if Karen were herself miraculously lucid for an interval ...and perceptive of her irreversible condition, she would effectively decide upon discontinuance of the life-support apparatus, even if it meant the
prospect of natural death." Id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663. The court was also sure that
this choice would "be accepted by a society the overwhelming majority of whose
members would, we think, in similar circumstances, exercise such a choice in the
same way for themselves or for those closest to them." Id. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at
664.
5 There has been a change in the doctrinal underpinning of the courts' decisions. At first, the courts based the right to discontinue treatment on the federal
constitutional right of privacy. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739-40, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 38-42, 355 A.2d 647, 662-64, cert. denied 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Recently,
more courts have been basing their decisions wholly or in part on common law
principles. See, e.g., In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 347, 529 A.2d 404, 410 (1987); In re
Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 376-77, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70-71, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 272-73
(1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). The first important decision discussing the
common law right to refuse even helpful medical treatment was Schloendorff v.
Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
The decisions based on constitutional principles had the disadvantage of foreclosing more flexible, legislative responses to this difficult area. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 15-11, at 937 (1st ed. 1978). Now, with more courts
basing their decisions on common law grounds, there have been more frequent
legislative responses. However, the courts have consistently held that these statutes supplement, rather than supplant, judicial responses. See Barber v. Superior
Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983); Corbett v. D'Alessandro,
487 So.2d 810 (Fla. App. 1986), rev. denied, 492 So.2d 133 (Fla. 1986); In re Guardianship of Hamlin, 102 Wash. 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984); In re Welfare of Colyer, 99
Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
For some recent discussions of legislative proposals, see Freamon, Death With
Dignity Laws: A Pleafor Uniform Legislation, 5 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 105 (1982); Note,
The Right to Die in New Jersey: Another Pleafor Legislation, 18 RUrGERS L.J. 235 (1986).
6 The United States Supreme Court, however, has been careful not to enter this
doctrinal area. The Court has denied certiorari in those cases that have been
brought before it. See, e.g., In re President and Directors of Georgetown College,
331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); In re Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Storar, 52
N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858
(1981).
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feel deeply ambivalent about the treatment decision; and with the
doctors and nurses-who have devoted their careers to saving
lives, but who are now asked to assist in ending life. 7 While the
courts' recognition of patients' rights in this area has remained
controversial, the decisions seem to have gained general popular
support.8
In Legal Frontiersof Death and Dying,9 Profession Norman Can0
tor' summarizes and discusses the right to die decisions. He
clarifies the concepts underlying the rights that courts have recognized. Professor Cantor offers unifying principles for justifying past decisions, and uses these principles to urge a further
expansion of patients' rights." He positions himselfjust slightly
ahead of developing case law. He would allow competent patients to discontinue' 2 life-preserving treatment even if the
patient could have been kept alive for long periods of time or
even restored to full health.' 3 Professor Cantor rejects the rea7 See Minow, Beyond State Intervention in the Family: ForBaby Jane Doe, 18 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 933, 994-95 (1985).
8 See 90o in Poll Back Patients' Right to Die, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1986, at 10,
col. 3.
9 N. CANTOR, LEGAL FRONTIERS OF DEATH AND DYING (1987). Other recent
overviews of the fight to die area include: L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION LAW
§ 15-11 (2d ed. 1988); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT (1983) [hereinafter, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION]; Hastings Center, Guidelines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment and the Care of the Dying (1987); MOONEY, Deciding Not to Resuscitate Hospital

Patients: Medical and Legal Perspectives, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1025.
10 Senior faculty member, Rutgers University School of Law, Newark, New
Jersey.
I I This book can be seen as a modification and elaboration of the ideas Professor Cantor advanced in earlier discussions of the fight to die problem. See Cantor,
Conroy, Best Interests, and the Handling of Dying Patients, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 543
(1985); Cantor, Quinlan, Privacy, and the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30
RUTGERS L. REV. 243 (1977); Cantor, A Patient'sDecision to Decline Life-Saving Medical
Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservationof Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228 (1973).
12 In this article, I will not distinguish between decisions to refuse treatment and
decisions to discontinue treatment. Though the distinction between refusing and
discontinuing treatment was considered significant in some early writings in this
area, it has been rejected by nearly every court and commentator that have recently
considered the question. See, e.g., HASTINGS CENTER, supra note 9, at 130.
13 N. CANTOR, supra note 9, at 16-30. Professor Cantor's analysis thus includes,
and agrees with, the court's conclusion in Bouvia v. Superior Court, where the patient was a paraplegic, not terminally ill, who wanted her feeding tube removed.
179 Cal. App.3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986). The court authorized the removal, even though there was evidence that the patient's intention was to commit
suicide.
Cantor draws the line at cases involving prisoners who are hunger-striking and
who want to resist force-feeding. He distinguishes these cases because the prison-
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soning in some of the earlier cases that would limit a competent
patient's right to refuse treatment to patients whose death was
imminent. 14
He bases his conclusions on the concepts of "self-determination or autonomy," which are "essential part[s] of the human
dignity cherished by American society." ' 5 Professor Cantor argues that these objectives lead to the conclusion that one's desire
to resist medical treatment and to shape one's dying process
should be respected. 16
Early writings about the right to refuse treatment suggested
that courts respond to these requests by characterizing the type
of treatment or the treatment decision based on the following
distinctions: distinctions between ordinary and extraordinary
treatment, between actively hastening death and passively allowing a person to die, between withholding and withdrawing
treatment, and between withholding nutrition and withholding
other forms of treatment. These distinctions were the tools the
courts and most commentators 1 7 used to differentiate the common law right to refuse treatment and the common law wrong of
suicide. More recent court decisions have rejected these distinctions, ' and Professor Cantor agrees. "Commentators struggle
to find bases on which to differentiate humane termination of
treatment of medical care from unlawful killing .... Judges [howers were using their refusal of both food and medical treatment not as a considered
choice to die but as a method of extorting concessions from the prison officials. See
In re Caulk, 125 N.H. 226, 480 A.2d 93 (1984); State ex rel. White v. Narick, 292
S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1982) (both rejecting prisoner's claim). But see Zant v. Prevatte,
248 Ga. 832, 286 S.E.2d 715 (1982) (recognizing the prisoner's claim).
14 N. CANTOR, supra note 9, at 11-16, 180-81. Accord Bartling v. Superior Court,
163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 192-93, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 223 (1984); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 433-38, 497 N.E.2d 626, 635-38 (1986); In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 355, 486 A.2d 1209, 1226 (1985).
15 N. CANTOR, supra note 9, at 19.
16 Id. at 19126, 180-82.
17 Such commentators include the Vatican. See Declarationon Euthanasia, the Sacred Congregationfor the Doctrine of the Faith, Vatican City (May 5, 1980), reprinted in
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 300.
18 See, e.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 438-39, 497
N.E.2d 626, 637-38; In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 369-74, 486 A.2d 1209, 1233-37. See
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 60-90. Occasionally a lower court decision will maintain some of these distinctions, despite contrary precedent. See Workmen's Circle Home v. Fink, 135 Misc. 270, 273-74, 514 N.Y.S.2d 893, 895-96 (Sup.
Ct. 1987) (passively allowing to die or actively hastening death); In re Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 134 Misc. 2d 206, 213-15, 510 N.Y.S.2d 415, 41820 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (withdrawing nutrition or withdrawing a respirator), rev'd, 129
A.D.2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1987).
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ever] have been able to endorse humane medical practices, especially those respecting decisions of competent patients, without
reliance on the arcane lines originally suggested."19
In the area of treatment decisions made in the name of incompetent patients, Professor Cantor argues that courts have
misapplied the formulated standards and that they have been too
restrictive as to when treatment may be discontinued. 20 There
are basically two approaches to decisionmaking for the incompetent patient: self-determination and best interests. 2 ' Under the
self-determination (or "subjective") standard, courts try to deter19 N. CANTOR, supra note 9, at 31-32. See also Handler, Social Dilemmas, Judicial
(Ir)resolutions, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 12-13 & n.31 (1987) (footnote omitted). Justice Handler commented:
These [judicial attempts to distinguish suicide from discontinuation of
treatment] are not entirely persuasive, .

.

. but they reflect our convic-

tions that differentiations can be made; a terminal patient's refusal of
extraordinary medical care seems to us an action different in kind from
someone shooting herself in the head.
Id. at 13.
20 N. CANTOR, supra note 9, at 58-62.
21 The most recent state court cases have continued to apply the analytical structure suggested in one of the earliest cases, Superintendent v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977), despite the fact that this analytical structure seems
inconsistent with the reasoning and holdings of the more recent cases. Saikewicz
listed four possible countervailing state interests: 1) the preservation of life; 2) the
protection of innocent third parties; 3) the prevention of suicide; and 4) the ethical
integrity of the medical profession. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
In the few recent cases in which authorization for discontinuation of treatment
was refused, none of these specific factors were given as justification. Rather the
holding was explained in terms of whether the "subjective" or "objective" standards have been met. See text accompanying notes 21-26.
"Medical ethics" was only seriously considered as a countervailing interest in
Quinlan. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 42-51, 355 A.2d 647, 664-69 (1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Even though authorizing the discontinuation of treatment appeared to be contrary to established medical procedures, by the time the
New Jersey right to die cases were argued in 1986, standards promulgated by the
major state and national medical groups were cited in favor of a broad right to
refuse or discontinue treatment. See In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 349-52, 529 A.2d
404, 411-12 (1987). The interest in preventing suicide has been dismissed as irrelevant in the few cases in which it has been seriously raised. See Bouvia v. Superior
Court, 179 Cal. App.3d 1127, 1142-45, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304-06 (1986); cf. Comment, Suicide Competence and the Patient's Right to Refuse Lifesaving Treatment, 75 CALIF.
L. REV. 707 (1987).

The interest in protecting third parties, was once the basis for refusing authorization. See In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000,
1008 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Holmes v. Silver Cross
Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125, 130 (N.D. Ill. 1972). This interest, however, has also
been rejected in all recent cases in which it has been considered. See, e.g., Wons v.
Public Health Trust, 500 So.2d 679, 688 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); St. Mary's
Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So.2d 666, 668-69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Mercy Hosp. v.
Jackson, 62 Md. App. 409, 417-18, 489 A.2d 1130, 1134 (1985), vacated as moot, 306
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mine what choice the patient would have made. This determination, optimally, will be based on explicit instructions left by the
patient when still competent. If such instructions are not available, the determination can be based on past comments the patient made about similar subjects 22 or based on a close friend's or
close relative's best surmise of how the patient would have reacted. In contrast, the best interests or "objective" standard reflects the traditional standard for guardians of the legally
incompetent. A guardian must always act in the best interests of
the incompetent. 23 There is a hierarchy within these standards;
courts usually attempt to apply a subjective standard, and resort
to an objective standard only when subjective standards are
completely inapplicable.24 Professor Cantor argues that when
possible, guardians and the courts should seek to effectuate the
incompetent patient's right to self-determination. 25 Cantor
warns, however, that courts may be too quick to label their determinations as "subjective" in situations where there is no available
basis for determining what the patient would have wanted.26
Md. 556, 510 A.2d 562 (1986); In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 352-53, 529 A.2d at 404,
412-13.
Cf. In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. App. 1987). In A.C., a hospital was granted
judicial authorization to render medical treatment to a terminally ill pregnant woman despite her refusal to consent. The treatment, a caesarean section, however,
was not sought for the woman's benefit. It was conceded that the procedure would
actually worsen her condition. The procedure's purpose was to give the fetus a
chance, albeit a slim one, of surviving. (In fact, both mother and child died soon
after the operation was performed.) The court concluded that "the trial judge did
not err in subordinating A.C.'s right against bodily intrusion to the interests of the
unborn child and the state." Id. at 617.
22 An interesting "feed back" seems to be occurring within the right to die cases.
The publicity given the Quinlan case has made determinations of patients' wishes in
later cases easier. In many recent cases, patients' friends and family have been able
to analogize the patients' reactions to In re Quinlan. Patients have stated that they
would not want to be kept alive if they were in the same situation as Ms. Quinlan.
See, e.g., In reJobes, 108 N.J. 394, 410, 529 A.2d 434, 442 (1987); In re Delio v.
Westchester County Medical Center, 129 A.D.2d 1, 6-7, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 681-82
(1987).
23 For a discussion of the weaknesses and strengths of both approaches to
decisionmaking, see In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 432-37, 529 A.2d 434, 453-56 (1987)
(Handler, J., concurring); see also Minow, supra note 7, at 971-74; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 132-36.
24 See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 358-68, 486 A.2d 1209, 1228-33 (1985).
25 N. CANTOR, supra note 9, at 64-67, 79.
26 Id. at 60, 91-96. The most egregious mislabeling may have occurred in the
case of Superintendent v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 413 (1977) where
the court put forward the following standard: "the decision in cases such as this
should be that which would be made by the incompetent person, if that person
were competent, but taking into account the present and future incompetency of

1988]

BOOK REVIEW

529

Professor Cantor, unlike most of the courts which have considered the issue, seems fully to appreciate the conceptual complexities even in the most straightforward "subjective" decision.
The extent to which the court could go in a case like Farrell
to show that a treatment decision for a competent patient conforms to her right of self-determination, indicates how unsure we
should be that treatment decisions for incompetent patients vindicate their right of self-determination. Experts interviewed Mrs.
Farrell to determine that she was competent, her decision was
unwavering and not the product of undue influence, and, she understood her condition, her prognosis, and the consequences of
discontinuing treatment.2 7 Incompetent patients are unable to
be questioned and a recent statement of preference cannot be
considered equivalent to a decision made when fully facing the
terminal consequences. 2 8
Professor Cantor is uncomfortable with the criteria courts
have established for applying the "best interests" standard. Under such standards, a court is often required to determine a
patient's level of pain. 29 "A major problem ...in administering
a best interests standard geared to the temporal physical and
mental pain of an incompetent patient is that such suffering (and
countervailing positive feelings) may be largely indeterminable." 3 0
For anyone offering a theory about how the courts should
decide right to die cases, the most revealing question is how the
theory would resolve two extreme (though far from unrealistic)
fact situations. First, the patient is legally incompetent and there
is no basis for determining what she would have decided: there is
the individual as one of the factors which would necessarily enter into the decisionmaking process of the competent person." Id. at 752-53, 370 N.E.2d at 431. The
"subjective" determination under this standard would be complicated even more,
for in Saikewicz, as in many other cases, the patient not only was incompetent at the
time of the treatment decision, but he had never been competent. Id. at 419, 370
N.E.2d at 729.
27 In re Farrell, 212 N.J. Super. 294, 294-300, 514 A.2d 1342, 1342-44 (1986),
aff'd, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987).
28 See In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 956-59 (Me. 1987) (Clifford, J., dissenting);
In reJobes, 108 N.J. 394, 432-33, 438 n.9, 529 A.2d at 434, 453-54, 456 n.9 (Handler, J., concurring).
29 See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 364-67, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231-33 (1985), cf.
HASTINGS CENTER, supra note 9, at 28-29.
30 N. CANTOR, supra note 9, at 75. Some medical authorities seem to believe that
"[i]f medicine's capacity for relieving pain and suffering were fully tapped," there
would be no justification for discontinuation of treatment on the basis of the patient's level of pain. See HASTINGS CENTER, supra note 9, at 129.
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no evidence of prior comments on the subject, and no close
friends or relatives. Second, the patient seeks to refuse treatment when the refusal would probably result in death, but with
treatment the patient would be restored to full physical and
mental functioning.
As to the first extreme case, Professor Cantor offers a subtle
but provocative position. He argues that a broad set of standards
can be established for incompetent patients for whom the subjective standard is inappropriate, without relying exclusively on determinations of the patient's level of pain. Professor Cantor
postulates that a consensus can be created through case law and
accompanying public opinion regarding circumstances under
which persons would want treatment discontinued. "[I]t may be
possible to gradually discern acceptable societal norms of humane handling of moribund patients. . . . [S]hared notions of
human dignity will ultimately govern 1decision-making on behalf
3
of incompetent moribund patients."1
Professor Cantor suggests some "tentative answers" to the
question of what form this consensus may eventually take: pa32
tients should be granted relief from painful dying processes;
when there is a total absence of mentation (patients who are comatose or in a permanent vegetative state) "termination of life
support is consistent with respect for human dignity" 3 3 and termination of treatment may be humane for patients who were
"formerly active, independent, and articulate," whose condition
has deteriorated to "total immobility, along with virtually total
incomprehension" or who need to use elaborate physical restraints.34 If Professor Cantor's view can be criticized, it would
be for being premature in his prediction of a developing consensus and perhaps a little too optimistic about the ability of judges
to find the best answers.
The unstated conceptual assumption of Professor Cantor's
approach to the right to die cases is that the fear of abuse cuts
both ways. In the event of doubt, treatment should not always
continue.3 ' The argument is that there are situations so contrary
31 N. CANTOR,
32 Id. at 79.

supra note 9, at 76-77.

33 Id. at 79-81.
34

Id. at 81-82.

35 See Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379

So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980). The Florida District Court of Appeals stated:
Itisall very convenient to insist on continuing Mr. Perlmutter's life so
that there can be no question of foul play, no resulting civil liability and
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to human dignity that (if there is no evidence of the patient's
desires to the contrary) treatment should be discontinued, and it
would be an abuse not to do so. The question of dignity is obviously separate from any claim based on autonomy. A claim based
on dignity is more amorphous, harder to ground in traditional
legal analyses, and perhaps more controversial once translated
into specific criteria.
As to the second extreme case, Professor Cantor seems willing to recognize a right to refuse life-saving treatment regardless
of the prognosis. 3 6 The following quotation is illustrative of Professor Cantor's approach to the right to die issues.
The thesis is that patient self-determination or autonomy is an
essential part of the human dignity cherished by American society. That dignity is impinged when a competent person's
voluntary choice is overridden, even where the patient's determination is distasteful to the medical and judicial personnel
confronting the situation. Perhaps the offense to human dignity and autonomy exists in its most objectionable form where
treatment is forced on a dying patient who is intent on maintaining dignity in the face of an irremediable dying process.
But an offense exists as well when the will of a salvageable patient is overridden.3 7
It is difficult to test one's position against actual fact situations of the
second type of extreme case, because, unlike the first type of extreme case, these cases do not seem to reach the courts without factors that present alternative bases for decision.3 "
no possible trespass on medical ethics. However it is quite another matter to do so at the patient's sole expense and against his competent will,
thus inflicting never ending physical torture on his body until the inevitable, but artificially suspended, moment of death.
Satz, 362 So.2d at 164. See also In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
The New Jersey Supreme Court advanced: "To err either way-to keep a person
alive under circumstances under which he would rather have been allowed to die,
or to allow that person to die when he would have chosen to cling to life-would be
deeply unfortunate." Id. at 343, 486 A.2d at 1220.
36 N. CANTOR, supra note 9, at 16-26, 180-81.
37 Id. at 19-20.
38 Three types of cases exemplify this extreme situation. The first category are
cases where patients refuse to consent to life-saving amputations of a limb knowing
that death is likely without the operation. See, e.g., In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J.
Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (Morris County Ct. 1978). Professor Cantor recognized
that these cases can be seen as judicial deference to understandable value judgments: "What is distasteful to these patients is the prospective incapacity and dependency after the amputation. The lesson of the amputation cases ought to be
that patient autonomy includes the prerogative to resist life-preserving treatment
where the existence to be preser.ed would represent a subjective hell for the patient." The second category of cases are those in which a patient refuses relatively
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The development of case law may "define classes of cases in
which decision-making principles are well established, and in which
such principles are routinely applied to actual cases without reported abuse. Those decisions can safely be left to the traditional
decision-making processes-medical staff and next of kin acting in
conjunction with one another."3 Treatment decisions are scrutinized according to a number of factors: the vulnerability of the patient, whether established procedures and standards are available
within the medical care community, and how likely error or improper motive 40 would be in particular situations. 4 1 Professor Cantor points out that there will always be procedural and institutional
checks on these decisions to prevent abuse: decisions can be challenged within institutions by doctors or ethics committees, or they
can be challenged in court by concerned friends, relatives or the
state's public advocate. Additionally, patients can always leave instructions specifying that they wish to be maintained even if they
suffer extreme physical and mental deterioration.4 2
The right to die cases are difficult in part because they present
the legal system with novel situations, which were borne of modern
technology. Traditional legal doctrines fit only awkwardly when applied to these issues. 43 The difficulty of these cases may also come
from our seeking legal answers to problems too deeply rooted in the
human situation to be solved by statements about rights and liberties. Our doubts and hesitations regarding these cases come from
trivial life-sustaining treatment because such treatment is contrary to religious beliefs. See, e.g., Wons v. Public Health Trust, 500 So.2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987); In re Brown, 478 So.2d 1033 (Miss. 1985); In re Milton, 29 Ohio St. 3d 20,
505 N.E.2d 255 (1987). In these cases, countervailing state interests must overcome not only the patient's right to refuse treatment, but also her right to religious
free expression. The third category of cases are those involving hunger-striking
prisoners. See supra note 13.
Cf. Evans v. Bellevue Hosp., No. 16536/87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 27, 1987);
N.Y.LJ. July 28, 1987, at 11, col. 1. In Evans, the patient was unconscious due to
the effects of an AIDS-related disease. He had explicitly requested no medical
treatment if he could not be restored to a "meaningful quality of life." The judge
refused to authorize the discontinuation of treatment because the patient was not
terminally ill, and his present infection was considered treatable.
39 N. CANTOR, supra note 9, at 117.
40 Professor Cantor offers an interesting discussion of "improper factors" in
treatment decision-making. See N. CANTOR, supra note 9, at 83-91. Cf. Minow, supra
note 7, at 974-76, 1001-04.
41 See In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); In re Peter byJohanning,
108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987); In reJobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
These cases establish varying substantive and procedural criteria, depending on the
factual context, for authorizing the discontinuation of treatment.
42 N. CANTOR, supra note 9, at 82.
43 See generally Handler, supra note 19.
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problems of trust and distrust, which cannot be glossed over by the
legal system, but might be ameliorated by procedural changes in
some of the institutions involved in this litigation.4 4 We distrust the
motivation of guardians who are too close to the patient; they cannot be objective.4 5 But we also distrust decisionmakers who are not
close enough to the patient; how can they know what the patient
would have wanted? We distrust decisions made by hospitals and
nursing homes, because we fear for the vulnerability of elderly patients cut off from family and friends, and we fear that treatment
decisions might sometimes be made out of concerns of profit or
convenience.4 6
44 See Minow, supra note 7, at 998-1009. Professor Minow discusses how the
search for the optimal distribution of rights and protective procedures may serve
only to hide the real underlying probleirs. She commented:
No new substantive rule, procedural technique, or new position on the
state intervention debate will promote trust between people concerning
this subject that so invokes personal vulnerabilities.... Over time new
rules may well secure public confidence through new routines that recede into the background of settled expectations much like the old routines .... The debates over state intervention, right to life versus quality
of life, and procedural alternatives themselves express dimensions of
distrust between people--distrust that runs deeper than the particular
medical treatment decisions at issue. Addressing the conditions of distrust themselves may open the way for new routines to gain wide acceptability for dealing with medical treatment decisions .... Because sharp
disagreements are bound to persist, these routines will chiefly involve
ways of channeling disagreement away from simplistic, adversarial alternatives, and toward contextual discussions that address what really
could and should happen ....
Id. at 999.
45 See Superintendent v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 758-59, 370 N.E.2d 417, 43435. The Massachusetts Supreme Court stated:
We take a dim view of any attempt to shift the ultimate decision-making
responsibility away from the duly established courts. . . . [S]uch questions of life and death seem to us to require the process of detached but
passionate investigation and decision that forms the ideal on which the
judicial branch of government was created.
Id. See also In re Beth Israel Medical Center, 136 Misc. 931, 519 N.Y.S.2d 511 (Sup.
Ct. 1987) (implying that friends and relatives may, out of mercy, make up "recalled" relevant comments by the now-incompetent patient); Merritt, Equality for the
Elderly Incompetent: A Proposalfor Dignified Death, 39 STANFORD L. REV. 689, 724-25
(1987) (A grieving family may falsely project their own suffering onto the incompetent patient.).
46 See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 374-85, 486 A.2d 1209, 1237-42 (1985). The
courts' troublesome problem of trust and distrust can be seen perhaps most clearly
in Quinlan. The court purports to discuss the patient's right to choose and what
choice she would have made. However, most of the opinion is devoted to describing the patient's guardian, her father, as a religious person, a caring person, a person without ulterior motives, and a person who came to the decision to discontinue
Ms. Quinlan's treatment only after lengthy deliberation. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,
28-34, 53, 355 A.2d 647, 656-60, 670-71 (1976), cert. denied. 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
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Consider the courts' confused discussions of whether it is appropriate to consider "quality of life" factors in decisionmaking for
incompetent patients.4 7 Several things are clear from reading such
discussions. First, there is no agreement on what is meant by "quality of life" as a factor in a medical treatment decision.4 8 Second, the
courts are using "quality of life" as a straw man argument. To my
knowledge, no party or amicus curiae to a right to die case has ever
argued, as one court implied had occurred, that medical treatment
should be terminated because the patient's "value to society seems
negligible."' 49 The opinions are trying to respond to public distrust
of decisions to discontinue medical treatment.50 The courts are
trying to form positions which seem more trustworthy, more reasonable, more benign and more objective 5 ' by contrasting their standards with irrational or dangerous hypothetical standards.
The courts seek decisionmaking approaches that will both respect the right to refuse medical treatment and assure the public
that such decisions are being made for legitimate reasons. In In re
Conroy, the New Jersey Supreme Court may have tried too hard to
gain public trust. The procedures set up by the court 5 2 were so
In sharp contrast to more recent right to die opinions, we learn a great deal about
the patient's guardian from the opinion, and almost nothing about the patient.
47 Compare Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 433-34, 497
N.E.2d 626, 635 (1986) with In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 363-67, 486 A.2d 1201,
1232-33 and 98 N.J. at 391-92, 397-99, 486 A.2d at 1246, 1249 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See generally Handler, supra note 19, at 18-20 &
n.62.
Professor Cantor's discussion of "quality of life" is far more clear and helpful.
N. CANTOR, supra note 9, at 53-57, 180-82. Cf. Merritt, supra note 45, at 734-35;
Minow, supra note 7, at 954-56, 961-69.
48 For example, the Brophy opinion rejected "qualify of life" factors, immediately
after it affirmed consideration of factors that the Conroy majority would have labeled
as "quality of life." See supra note 47.
49 See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 367, 486 A.2d 1209, 1233.
50 Still fresh in many persons' memories are the atrocities that doctors in Nazi
Germany committed under the aegis of euthanasia and "quality of life" determinations. See R. LISTON, THE NAZI DOCTORS (1986).
51 The majority opinion in Conroy labeled as a "pure-objective test" the standard
that allowed the termination of treatment for terminally ill patients suffering from
"recurring, unavoidable and severe pain." Conroy, 98 N.J. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232.
However, it is not self-evident that every decision made for a patient under this
standard would be what the patient would have wanted. Some patients may have
desired the continuation of life-sustaining treatment even under extreme circumstances. Some patients might value a view of human dignity higher than the avoidance of pain. There is no "objective" reason for attributing to incompetent
patients pain as a factor for treatment decisions. See id. at 393-96, 486 A.2d at
1247-48 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); In re Jobes, 108
N.J. 365, 441, n. 12, 529 A.2d 434, 458 n.12 (Handler, J., concurring).
52 See Conroy, 98 N.J. at 379-84, 486 A.2d at 1240-42.
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cumbersome that affected persons apparently chose not to exercise
their right or to circumvent the procedures.5 3
The courts' reasoning in upholding patients' rights has been
broader than what was necessary to decide the questions before
them. This has led some commentators to question what limitations
there are on patients' rights in this area.5 4 Courts circumvented this
line-drawing problem by relying (explicitly or implicitly) on an intuitive, but ultimately unprincipled, distinction: the difference between termination of treatment that simply allows an inexorable
dying process to continue and situations where that characterization
does not seem appropriate.5 5 If there is a right to refuse medical
treatment, why should that right vary in strength depending on the
person's prognosis? If our constitutional right to privacy allows us,
rather than our doctors or the government, to control how we are to
be treated near death, why should this right wax and wane according
to our level of consciousness or our level of pain?5 6 The answer
given is that the state interest in life diminishes as the patient's
53 Well over 100 persons made inquiries with the office of the Ombudsman for
the Institutionalized Elderly regarding the procedures to be followed for authorizing the withdrawal of medical treatment for nursing home patients. Yet only one
case had been officially brought to the Ombudsman's attention, the first step in the
procedures. Sullivan, Curbs on Ending Life Supports Are Ignored, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28,
1986, at B15, col. 1.
54 See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 1366-71.
55 See, e.g.,
Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334, 1344
(Del. 1980) ("the penumbra where death begins but life, in some form, continues
...the medical miracles which now compel us to distinguish between 'death' as we
have known it, and death in which the body lives in some fashion but the brain (or a
significant part of it) does not."); In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 445-46, 321 S.E.2d 716,
722, 723 (1984) ("Under these circumstances, we find that the life support system
was prolonging her death rather than her life ....While the state has an interest in
the prolongation of life, the state has no interest in the prolongation of dying."); In
re Eichner, 102 Misc. 2d 184, 204, 423 N.Y.S.2d 580, 593 (Sup. Ct. 1979) ("a treatment which, in these circumstances, serves only more or less briefly to extend the
process of dying"), modified, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980), modified, 52
N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858
(1981); Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 6, 426 N.E.2d
809, 812 (1980) ("She is on the threshold of death, and man has, through a new
medical technology, devised a way of holding her on that threshold.").
56 The shifting balance analysis, with obvious resonance from Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) was advanced in In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976),
cert. denied 429 U.S. 922 (1976). "We think that the State's interest contra weakens
and the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims. Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual's rights overcome the state interest." Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
This analytical structure has been adopted unquestioned by many subsequent decisions. See, e.g., In re Beth Israel Medical Center, 136 Misc. 931, 942, 519 N.Y.S.2d
511, 518. Later commentators, however, have shown that this reasoning is inappropriate and illogical within the right to die area. See Capron, Borrowed Lessons: The
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prognosis dims. 5 7
However, that seems wrong as well, for it requires that states
"regularly make value judgments about the value of a life," a position that most courts have taken great efforts to avoid.5 s Professor
Cantor is correct in arguing for a right that is invariable. The
courts' contrary position is a result of distrust or lack of confidence
in the decisionmaking process. They fear that the possibility, and
the consequences, of abuse might be greater if the scope of the right
includes patients not close to death. 59 However, as long as the medical treatment decisions are grounded in the common law right to
refuse treatment, the fear that courts will cross the line between discontinuation of treatment and "active euthanasia" is unfounded.6 "
Professor Cantor has given us an important and well-written
guide to a doctrinal area in its adolescence. The right to die area is
still developing. The courts' analytical tools are only just beginning
to fit the breadth of the factual situations before them and the subtle
but important differences among those situations. The courts are
becoming more comfortable in dealing with the problems of medical treatment cases. In retrospect, the earlier opinions can be seen
to reflect a caution and hesitancy that is slowly fading. 6 1 However,
we are still far from the consistency and uniformity of a more developed doctrinal area: regarding, e.g. the criteria for a "best interests"
standard and the procedures for authorizing discontinuation of
treatment. Professor Cantor helps us to understand this field in
transition, and he offers one possible path along which doctrine
might develop.

62

Brian Bix*
Role of Ethical Distinctions in Framing Law on Life-Sustaining Treatment, 1984 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 647, 656-58; L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 1367-68.
57 See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664.
58 L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 1366; see supra text accompanying notes 47-51.
59 See In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 365, 430-31, 529 A.2d 434, 455-56 (Handler, J.,
concurring).
60 See, e.g., HASTINGS CENTER, supra note 9, at 128-29.
61 See supra notes 4 & 56.
62 Professor Cantor devotes a chapter of his book to the related topic of treatment decisions for severely handicapped infants. Though he deals with issues and
procedural problems unique to that area, his analysis follows many of the concepts
and arguments that he advanced in his discussion of the right to die cases.
On the topic of the appropriate standards and procedures in treatment decisions for severely handicapped infants, I have nothing to add to the fine analysis
and discussion offered by Professor Minow in Minow, Beyond State Intervention in the
Family: For Baby Jane Doe, 18 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 933 (1985).
* Clerk to Judge Stephen Reinhardt, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals;J.D. 1986,
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Harvard Law School. I am indebted to David Price, Paul Bland, and Scott Brewer
for their comments on earlier drafts of this review.

